

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WBSMITHII:SEB-SKG
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
S/S-O:S.GOLDSMITH

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E.O. 11652:XGDS-3

TAGS:PFOR, MASS, US, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI MILITARY REQUESTS; BEGIN VISIT TO U.S.

1. SUMMARY. DINITZ RAISED FOLLOWING ARMS ISSUES JUNE 27 WITH THE SECRETARY AND RECEIVED FOLLOWING REPLIES. KFIRS FOR ECUADOR: U.S. HAD MADE ITS DECISION AND IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WOULD NOT RECONSIDER. F-16S: DISCUSSED AT RECENT MEETING AND UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. CHARIOT TANKS: THE SECRETARY WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER. HYDROFOILS: DISCUSSED AT RECENT MEETING AND UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. MAVERICKS, CBU-71S, MUNITIONS: IN PROCESS. SYLVANIA/TADIRAN: THE SECRETARY WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER. TWO SUPERMYSTERES FOR HONDURAS: U.S. WOULD REVIEW. TURNING TO BEGIN VISIT, DINITZ PREDICTED NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE ON ALL THREE FRONTS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. HE URGED THAT U.S. STRESS IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT IN U.S.

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VIEW, BOUNDARY, PEACE, AND PALESTINIAN ISSUES MUST ALL BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT U.S. HAD REPEATEDLY MADE THIS CLEAR. ANSWERING DINITZ, THE SECRETARY FELT MOST IMPORTANT THING TO MAKE BEGIN VISIT SUCCESS WOULD BE FOR PRIME MINISTER TO BE PREPARED TO CONVEY DETAILED VIEWS ON ALL ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES AND INDICATE HOW FAR HE WAS READY TO GO, INCLUDING ON TOUGH PROBLEMS SUCH AS SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WHEN DINITZ ASKED THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON

NEXT STEPS, THE SECRETARY INDICATED HE WOULD PROBABLY GO TO AREA ONE OR TWO WEEKS AFTER BEGIN VISIT, WOULD START WITH ISRAEL, AND STILL HOPED GENEVA COULD BE CONVENED IN FALL. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR DINITZ CALLED AT HIS REQUEST JUNE 27 ON THE SECRETARY TO REVIEW BILATERAL ISSUES BEFORE DEPARTING NEXT DAY FOR PRE-BEGIN VISIT CONSULTATIONS IN ISRAEL. DINITZ WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM BAR-ON, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON ATTENDED. DINITZ MENTIONED HE HAD COVERED SAME GROUND EARLIER IN DAY WITH N.S. ADVISER BRZEZINSKI.

3. KFIRS FOR ECUADOR.
DINITZ SAID HE HAD SPECIAL REQUEST FROM PRIME MINISTER WHICH HE HOPED THE SECRETARY WOULD BRING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION. ECUADOR HAD INFORMED ISRAEL THAT IT HAD NOTIFIED U.S. IF NO REPLY RECEIVED BEFORE JULY 1, ECUADOR HAD DECIDED TO APPROACH FRANCE TO ACQUIRE F-1 AIRCRAFT. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HOPED THERE COULD BE LAST MINUTE U.S. RECONSIDERATION ON KFIR SALE TO ECUADOR, IN VIEW OF FACT U.S. PRINCIPLES ON ARMS FOR LATIN AMERICA WERE GOING TO BE VIOLATED IN ANY CASE, AND ONLY LOSER WOULD BE ISRAEL.

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THE SECRETARY REPLIED ECUADOR HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH U.S. AND MENTIONED LIKELIHOOD OF APPROACH TO FRANCE. U.S. HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO ECUADOR IT WOULD NOT SELL F-5 AIRCRAFT. THE SECRETARY WOULD THINK OVER BEGIN'S REQUEST, BUT TO BE HONEST, HE DID NOT THINK U.S. WOULD RECONSIDER, DESPITE IMPORTANCE OF POSSIBLE SALE TO ISRAEL.

4. F-16'S.
DINITZ SAID ISRAEL APPRECIATED RELEASE BY U.S. ON THREE MILITARY ITEMS OVER WEEKEND. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED SEVERAL ISRAELI REQUESTS UNDER U.S. CONSIDERATION FOR A LONG TIME, IN SOME INSTANCES GOING BACK TO PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS F-16'S. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ATTENDED A MEETING JUST THE OTHER DAY AT WHICH ISRAELI F-16 REQUEST WAS DISCUSSED, AND IT WAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGN LETTER OF INTENT, LEAVING IN ABEYANCE QUESTIONS OF NUMBER AND CO-PRODUCTION. THE SECRETARY SAID PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S PLACE IN QUEUE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED AT RECENT MEETING, AND HE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER.

5. CHARIOT TANK.

DINITZ EXPLAINED ISRAEL HAD REQUESTED CONVERSION OF 106 MILLION DOLLARS FROM U.S. FUNDING INTO ISRAELI POUNDS OVER THREE TO FOUR YEAR

PERIOD FOR USE IN ISRAEL FOR PRODUCTION OF ISRAELI TANKS
AND REDUCTION BY 178 TANKS FROM M-60 U.S. TANKS DESTINED
FOR ISRAEL. DINITZ SAID ISRAELIS HAD IMPRESSION U.S. WAS
REVIEWING THIS REQUEST WITH SYMPATHY. THE SECRETARY SAID

HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT.

6. HYDROFOILS.

THE SECRETARY INFORMED DINITZ THIS ISRAELI REQUEST HAD ALSO
BEEN DISCUSSED AT RECENT MEETING AND WAS UNDER ACTIVE CON-

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SIDERATION.

7. CONSOLIDATED LIST.

DINITZ SAID RELEASE OF THREE ITEMS OVER WEEKEND COVERED
ONLY PART OF 1977 SLICE OF ISRAEL'S CONSOLIDATED LIST OF
PROJECTED ARMS REQUESTS. OTHER ITEMS WERE DUE IN 1977,
SUCH AS MAVERICK AND CBU-71'S, AND ISRAEL HAD BEEN PROMISED
EARLY REPLY SOME TIME AGO. MUNITIONS FOR 1977 ALSO WERE
PENDING, AND DINITZ BELIEVED MATTER COULD BE RESOLVED. IT
WAS URGENT, AS ISRAEL WAS SHORT OF AMMUNITION.

8. SYLVANIA/TADIRAN.

BAR-ON EXPLAINED TADIRAN HAD BEEN WORKING FOR SEVERAL YEARS
ON SINGLE CHANNEL GROUND AND AIR RADIO SYSTEMS. SYLVANIA,
WHICH OWNED HALF INTEREST IN TADIRAN, WANTED TO BID
ON R AND D CONTRACTS WHICH PENTAGON WAS ABOUT TO ISSUE AND
USE TADIRAN MANPOWER. PENTAGON, APPARENTLY CITING SECURITY
ISSUES, WOULD NOT LET SYLVANIA BID. HOWEVER, TWO OTHER
U.S. FIRMS HAVING BRITISH SUBSIDIARIES WERE BIDDING.
APPARENTLY STATE DEPARTMENT HAD CONCURRED IN PENTAGON ATTITU-
TUDE. ATHERTON EXPLAINED NATIONAL DISCLOSURE COMMITTEE IN
PENTAGON HAD DISAPPROVED ON BASIS OF ITS RULES, AND MATTER
HAD NOT COME TO STATE DEPARTMENT. RULING HAD BEEN SYLVANIA
PARTICIPATION COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED, ALTHOUGH SYLVANIA HAD
THE NEEDED TECHNOLOGY. DINITZ REMARKED TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED
WAS IN LARGE MEASURE ISRAELI. BAR-ON SUGGESTED TECHNO-
LOGICAL AND CRYPTOLOGICAL WORK COULD BE DIVIDED BETWEEN
U.S. AND ISRAEL TO AVOID SECURITY RISKS.

9. SUPER MYSTERES FOR HONDURAS.

DINITZ SAID ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED U.S. REPROACH OVER SALE OF
SIX SUPER MYSTERES TO HONDURAS, WHICH HAD BEEN INNOCENT IN
INTENT. ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO SELL EIGHT AND NOW HONDURAS

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WAS SEEKING REMAINING TWO. ISRAEL WANTED U.S. APPROVAL.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO ALL THESE MATTERS.
F-16'S AND HYDROFOILS WERE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.
MAVERICKS WERE IN PROCESS. HE WOULD CHECK INTO SYLVANIA
MATTER.

10. BEGIN VISIT.

11. DINITZ VOICED PERSONAL OPINION THAT ISRAEL WAS GOING
TO HAVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIME MINISTER READY TO NEGOTIATE

ON ALL THREE FRONTS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IT WOULD NOT
BE ISRAEL THAT WOULD PREVENT COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS.
HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN RECENT
WEEKS. THE SECRETARY AGREED. DINITZ CONTINUED THESE WERE
PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL
REGARDLESS OF CHARACTER OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THE SECRE-
TARY SAID HE NOW REALIZED DINITZ WAS REFERRING TO THINGS
WHICH U.S. HAD SAID. DINITZ STRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT
REFERENCES TO WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES WITH MINOR RECTIFI-
CATIONS AND TO PALESTINIAN HOMELAND HAD MADE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT. DINITZ HAD MADE THIS POINT TO THE
PRESIDENT AT TIME OF RABBI GOREN VISIT AND KNEW THE
PRESIDENT DID NOT AGREE. NEVERTHELESS, DINITZ COULD SHOW
TO THE SECRETARY STATEMENTS FROM ARAB CAPITALS INDICATING
A HARDENING OF ATTITUDES. ON THESE TWO ISSUES ARABS NOW
THOUGHT THEY HAD SUPPORT OF U.S. IF U.S. COULD SAY PROCESS
OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE OUTCOME ON ALL
THREE ELEMENTS--WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES, NATURE OF PEACE,
AND PALESTINIAN SOLUTION--IT WOULD EASE PSYCHOLOGICAL
ATMOSPHERE.

11. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT ISRAEL KNEW THE PRESIDENT'S
VIEWS, AND HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAELI POSITION ON MATTER. THE
PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, HAD REMARKED ON ALMOST EVERY OCCASION
THAT ULTIMATE DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE BY PARTIES.

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IT REMAINED THE PRESIDENT'S AND U.S. VIEW THAT SETTLEMENT
WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY PARTIES.

12. DINITZ SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HEAR THE SECRETARY'S
VIEWS ON HOW TO MAKE BEST USE OF BEGIN VISIT. THE SECRETARY
REPLIED MOST IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE FOR NEW PRIME MINISTER
TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT HIS VIEWS ON THE THREE CORE ISSUES
AND INDICATE WHERE HE WAS PREPARED TO GO AND DEGREE OF
FLEXIBILITY THAT EXISTED ON EACH ISSUE. FOR HIM TO COME
AND NOT BE ABLE TO EXPRESS CLEAR VIEWS ON EACH ISSUE WOULD
BE FRUSTRATING AND NOT USEFUL. THE PRESIDENT, FOR EXAMPLE,
WANTED TO KNOW HOW PRIME MINISTER SAW NATURE OF PEACE, AS
WE HAD SAID TO ALL THE ARABS THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE TRUE
PEACE ESTABLISHED. ALSO, THERE WAS MUCH CONFUSION AS TO

WHAT BEGIN HAD IN MIND CONCERNING WEST BANK. THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO KNOW BEGIN'S VIEWS ON WHOLE QUESTION OF BORDERS ON ALL THREE FRONTS. HE WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHAT BEGIN SAW AS SOLUTION FOR PALESTINIAN QUESTION, TOO. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO LEARN, ALSO, BEGIN'S APPROACH TO TIMING AND MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHICH THE SECRETARY WAS CERTAIN BEGIN HAD SPECIFIC IDEAS. IN SHORT, THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO GET

DOWN TO DETAILS AND NOT BE CONFINED TO GENERALITIES. IF BEGIN SPOKE OF DEFENSIBLE BORDERS, WE WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHAT HE MEANT. U.S. VIEWS WERE WELL-KNOWN ON ISSUE OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND WE WANTED TO KNOW BEGIN'S VIEWS. IN OTHER WORDS WE NEEDED TO DISCUSS ALL THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. DINITZ SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S THINKING TO PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. DINITZ KNEW BEGIN WAS ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH MODUS OPERANDI WITH U.S. ON HOW TO ADVANCE TOWARD PEACE.

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13. DINITZ ASKED THE SECRETARY HOW HE ENVISAGED NEXT STEPS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE EXPECTED TO VISIT MIDDLE EAST ONE OR TWO WEEKS AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT TO U.S. HE WOULD START WITH ISRAEL. IT WAS HARD FOR THE SECRETARY TO BE MORE SPECIFIC BECAUSE MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CAME OUT OF TALKS WITH BEGIN IN WASHINGTON. WHEN DINITZ ASKED ABOUT GENEVA, THE SECRETARY REPLIED HE WOULD STILL SAY HE HOPED TO SEE CONFERENCE CONVENED IN FALL. AT END OF MEETING DINITZ EXPLAINED HE HAD TALKED WITH THE SECRETARY ON VARIOUS OUTSTANDING ISRAELI ARMS REQUESTS BECAUSE BEGIN WOULD NOT WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS SUBJECT DURING HIS VISIT. VANCE

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WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 150563 SENT ACTION TEL AVIV 28 JUN 77

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 150563

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DINITZ SAID RELEASE OF THREE ITEMS OVER WEEKEND COVERED ONLY PART OF 1977 SLICE OF ISRAEL'S CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PROJECTED ARMS REQUESTS. OTHER ITEMS WERE DUE IN 1977, SUCH AS MAVERICK AND CBU-71'S, AND ISRAEL HAD BEEN PROMISED EARLY REPLY SOME TIME AGO. MUNITIONS FOR 1977 ALSO WERE PENDING, AND DINITZ BELIEVED MATTER COULD BE RESOLVED. IT WAS URGENT, AS ISRAEL WAS SHORT OF AMMUNITION.

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ON ALL THREE FRONTS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IT WOULD NOT BE ISRAEL THAT WOULD PREVENT COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS. THE SECRETARY AGREED. DINITZ CONTINUED THESE WERE PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL REGARDLESS OF CHARACTER OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE NOW REALIZED DINITZ WAS REFERRING TO THINGS WHICH U.S. HAD SAID. DINITZ STRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT REFERENCES TO WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES WITH MINOR RECTIFICATIONS AND TO PALESTINIAN HOMELAND HAD MADE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT. DINITZ HAD MADE THIS POINT TO THE PRESIDENT AT TIME OF RABBI GOREN VISIT AND KNEW THE PRESIDENT DID NOT AGREE. NEVERTHELESS, DINITZ COULD SHOW TO THE SECRETARY STATEMENTS FROM ARAB CAPITALS INDICATING A HARDENING OF ATTITUDES. ON THESE TWO ISSUES ARABS NOW THOUGHT THEY HAD SUPPORT OF U.S. IF U.S. COULD SAY PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE OUTCOME ON ALL THREE ELEMENTS--WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES, NATURE OF PEACE, AND PALESTINIAN SOLUTION--IT WOULD EASE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE.

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UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Channel Indicators: n/a
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Sent Date: 28-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE150563
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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/IAI:WBSMITHII:SEB-SKG
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Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2a209e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2013420
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ISRAELI MILITARY REQUESTS; BEGIN VISIT TO U.S.
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, IS
To: TEL AVIV
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2a209e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009